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Abstract 
This article leans against specialization by cutting across three disciplines to analyze the 
entrepreneurial function in modern, U.S capitalism. The author blends the basic ideas of Joseph A. 
Schumpeter (economics), Alfred D. Chandler (history), and Max Weber (sociology), with recent work 
done by Daniel Kahneman in behavioral economics. Two case studies are used to illustrate how these 
ideas interact in the study of innovation; one of the case studies focuses on a startup business and the 
other on a large, well-established, bureaucratic firm. 
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1. Introduction 
Specialization has contributed to the success of the developed economies, but it has also enacted a price. 
All too often, scholars today are isolated in their disciplinary and sub-disciplinary silos, reading only 
their major journals and remaining oblivious to closely related intellectual developments outside of 
their disciplinary boundaries. The following article addresses that problem and concludes that 
historians of modern America can develop new perspectives on capitalism and entrepreneurship, its 
driving force, by blending the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter, Alfred Chandler, and Max Weber with 
recent work in behavioral economics—in particular, the work of psychologist Daniel Kahneman. 
Schumpeter, Chandler, and Weber are, of course, very familiar to most historians, and especially those 
in economic and business history. Kahneman’s Nobel-Prize winning explorations of behavioral 
economics are, however, less well-known and certainly less frequently employed in recent historical 
studies of modern capitalism. This is likely to change in the next few years, and this article attempts to 
accelerate that process insofar as studies of U.S. entrepreneurship in the second half of the twentieth 
century are concerned (Note 1). Along the way, the article also tries to establish a nuanced, middle 
ground between the stereotypes of stultifying bureaucracy and energizing entrepreneurship. 
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2. Schumpeter and Kahneman 
Let’s start with Schumpeter, the intellectual father of entrepreneurial studies in economic and business 
history in America and many other countries. He was the classic intellectual hedgehog, that is, a thinker 
who developed a central synthesis that he elaborated and refined over his lifetime but never changed in 
any decisive way (Note 2). Like Marx, his protagonist and model, Schumpeter provided us with a 
history-based, dynamic theory that explained the evolution of capitalism. Schumpeter’s version was a 
growth-oriented system that was kept in permanent disequilibrium by the activities of its successful 
entrepreneurs (Note 3). The innovators who most interested Schumpeter were those who were most 
successful in developing businesses that reshaped production functions and thus drove the capitalist 
economy ahead in grand spurts of activity (Note 4). They created and moved markets. They were 
heroic business empire builders who, like Hegel’s blind heroes, achieved general results while they 
sought self-interested, specific ends (Note 5). In his last major work, Schumpeter suggested that 
bureaucracy inside and outside the capitalist enterprise would eventually suppress the system’s 
entrepreneurs.  
What then can Kahneman add to this important model of capitalism? Kahneman’s psychology—with 
its emphasis on fast (that is instinctive) and slow (that is calculating) thinking is particularly useful 
when we move down-scale to look at the middle and bottom of the entrepreneurial population at any 
one time. This brand of behavioral economics helps us understand why so many of those entrepreneurs 
failed, and why some tried again and again to build successful enterprises (Note 6). What they helped 
to launch were searches for viable opportunities, a general search process shaped in part by an 
entrepreneurial culture as well as economic incentives (Note 7). What Kahneman needs to take from 
Schumpeter is an emphasis on innovation’s central role in the capitalist growth process (Note 8). So in 
this case there can be a true blending of ideas. 
 
3. Chandler and Kahneman 
Kahneman’s approach to economic behavior can also add some important concepts to Alfred D. 
Chandler’s synthesis of American business history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chandler, 
like Schumpeter, stressed the role of major firms and their leaders in shaping a second industrial 
revolution that brought the United States to the top of the heap in global industry and giant firms to the 
top of the heap in the American economy. Chandler—another hedgehog—stressed economies of scale 
and scope in bringing about these seemingly costless and largely errorless transitions (Note 9). 
Kahneman’s approach suggests that even the moguls were likely to have frequently overestimated their 
power and, like Chandler, largely ignored their mistakes. Some of their mistakes became apparent 
during the eras of Progressive and New Deal reform. Some were revealed in antitrust cases (Note 10). 
Others became apparent during the Great Depression of the 1930’s and the three decades after WWII, 
when global competition began to wipe out entire American industries and take substantial market 
share from other U.S. enterprises in the 1960s and 1970s. As Kahneman notes, “the optimistic bias may 
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well be the most significant of the cognitive biases (Note 11).” Insofar as startups were significant 
during the post-WWII era, Kahneman makes us ponder the System 2 (slow thinking) capabilities they 
needed to succeed; they include: the ability to raise capital under conditions of uncertainty; to build an 
effective team; and to deal successfully with their business’s competitive and political environments. 
Insofar as large firms were innovative, Kahneman can benefit by accommodating Chandler’s great 
contribution: his emphasis upon the benefits of the massive organizational changes that took place 
when U.S. business leaders transformed centralized into decentralized and diversified industrial firms. 
Once again, there can be a creative sharing of ideas. 
 
4. Max Weber and Kahneman 
Now let’s add our third great hedgehog to the history. The sample I am using from Weber’s extensive 
work is the section of “The Theory of Social and Economic Organization” that deals with the three 
great structures of authority (Note 12). You will probably recall that Weber said bureaucracy “is 
superior to any other form [of authority] in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and 
in its reliability.” Central to Weber’s theory was his conclusion that all of the modern, developed 
societies had moved relentlessly toward the bureaucratic structure of authority because it was the most 
rational and efficient way to organize large groups of people (Note 13). Weber’s focus was primarily 
on the public sector, but he was mindful that modern businesses were also bureaucracies. 
The task of blending Weber’s sociology of “pure types” with behavioral economics and focusing the 
combination on entrepreneurship is challenging because Weber never seems to have worried about 
innovation and Kahneman only flirts briefly (pp. 417-418) with organizations and never specifically 
discusses bureaucracy. Despite this problem, I think we can link these two bodies of thought. 
Fortunately, Chandler and Schumpeter have provided us with intellectual bridges to Weber through 
their descriptions of private sector bureaucratization and its implications for the capitalist system. 
Schumpeter was intensely negative about both public and private bureaucratization; Chandler was 
intensely positive about what he referred to as “professional management”. He was largely dismissive 
of the public sector. 
Left suspended between these two evaluations, we can start to figure out where we stand by asking how 
public and private bureaucracy impacted the fast thinking (System 1) aspects of entrepreneurship. 
Clearly—following analysts such as Robert Merton, James B. Taylor, and Alvin 
Gouldner—bureaucracy in all of its forms primarily impaired the entrepreneurial instinct. In both 
startups and large firms, the leaders needed to grapple with what Kahneman calls WYSIATI, the 
assumption that “What You See Is All There Is”. WYSIATI and the closely related “sin” of hubris 
clearly kept many American executives from anticipating the intense global competition of the 1970s 
and 1980s (Note 14). Where slow thinking (System 2) aspects like obtaining capital, engaging in 
marketing and sales, and handling accounting were involved, however, the histories of 
entrepreneurship and bureaucratic authority are a mixed bag of negative and positive outcomes (Note 
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15). Perhaps the best way to start sorting those out is to look at some specific examples of 
entrepreneurship in postwar America.  
 
5. Results: System 1 and System 2 Thinking in Two Entrepreneurial Ventures 
For purposes of illustration (not proof) we can consider a specific example of successful innovation in 
the midst of the intense, destabilizing postwar competition. This case involves the classic startup firm 
with a clearly identified entrepreneur. The business in this instance is SNL, which should prompt you 
to reflect for a moment on the 1980s when the United States suffered through a Savings and Loan 
(hence S&L) crisis. The problem that entrepreneur Reid Nagle set out to solve, however, did not 
directly involve regulation, deregulation, or inflation—some of the problems used to explain the crisis. 
Nagle’s interest was in supplying accurate and timely information to those large firms that had 
economic ties to the S&Ls—a System 1, fast-thinking decision. He knew from experience that each of 
these organizations had to dig out and evaluate the information they needed from each S&L with which 
they were doing business. In effect, he was proposing to make business bureaucracies his market and 
make them more efficient by consolidating and selling information from the regulatory bureaucracy. 
Nagle built a small organization around the task of searching for, consolidating, and selling information 
that was available to anyone. Using his own capital and advice from his network, he paid to have a 
unique computer platform developed for the data. In the course of these System 2 activities, he had the 
advantage of an extensive personal network and his prior experience in this corner of finance. 
Despite Nagle’s strengths, SNL had three major problems in its early years, all of which required 
substantial System 2 capabilities. Before the development of personal computers and the Internet, the 
work of gathering and processing information was extremely labor-intensive. Nagle, his wife, and staff 
had to dig out the information they needed in Washington, Xerox it, and then, back in their Hoboken 
headquarters, transfer it to their platform, process it, and print it out (Note 16). For a considerable 
length of time, Nagle was putting in the kind of 100-hour weeks we usually associate with two-job, 
recent immigrants and DC cab drivers. The second major problem was working capital. Like many a 
startup before and after SNL, Nagle ran out of money. He was forced to sell some of his time in 
consulting, and he “maxed” all of his credit cards before he managed to acquire the investment capital 
he needed without losing control of the firm. The third problem was competition. He was not guilty of 
WYSIATI. He knew he did not have patent protection for what SNL was doing and he knew a good bit 
about the other organizations selling the same or similar information. His competitors were, however, 
connected to other financial institutions that were likely to be competitive with the businesses Nagle 
had targeted as his likely customers. He saw where his competitors were vulnerable. That was his 
initial selling point and it proved to be effective. His bureaucratic competitors suffered a fit of 
WYSIATI and reacted too slowly. With his platform in place, he was then able gradually to expand, 
with very little additional cost, the information he could provide. As he did so, SNL competed by 
offering add-ons free and pushing additional competitors out of the market. Nagle’s variant on this 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jrph                 Journal of Research in Philosophy and History              Vol. 3, No. 1, 2020 
31 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
“Pac-Man strategy” was successful and would later be employed by a number of the high-tech giants of 
the digital era (Note 17). Happy to be an entrepreneur but less happy as a manager of a successful firm, 
he finally sold SNL to Standard & Poors for $2.25 billion in 2015. 
This successful outcome leaves us with two big questions to ponder: First, if this type of innovation 
was going on across a broad front in the digital era—and there is substantial evidence that it was—why 
do the improvements not show up in our figures for Total Factor Productivity? Second, if 
bureaucratization was generating opportunities like this for innovation, does it seems possible that 
America’s future will be with a workable form of democratic capitalism and a compromise between 
America’s bureaucratic and entrepreneurial organizations and cultures? That, for the short- and the 
middle-term appears more likely than a Kafka-like dystopia. 
My second example of successful postwar entrepreneurship provides a sharp contrast with SNL. Here, 
we are looking at one of America’s large, science-based, bureaucratic firms of that era. During the early 
1960s, Merck & Co., Inc., was a successful pharmaceutical business headquartered in New Jersey, with 
important operations in Pennsylvania and links to many other states and to other nations, primarily in 
the developed world (Note 18). While the business had a history of successful innovation (especially 
from 1933-1970), Merck’s CEO, Henry Gadsden was advised in the early 1970s to seek new leadership 
for his research division and make a radical change in the organization’s scientific tactics and strategy 
(Note 19). His initial decision to accept this advice had elements of System 1, instinctive thinking. 
Gadsden was not a scientist; he had come to leadership through sales and marketing. When he followed 
this advice and appointed Dr. Roy Vagelos as head of basic research in 1974, he was embracing 
substantial uncertainty and making himself the financier (á la Schumpeter) of an entrepreneurial 
venture in a bureaucratic setting (á la Chandler and Weber). The Merck bureaucracy (contra Weber and 
á la Robert Merton’s critique) quietly but forcefully resisted this transition to targeted, biochemical 
research. 
The primary entrepreneur, Vagelos, had also embraced uncertainty (contra Schumpeter) because he had 
no prior knowledge of business. He had, however, substantial experience in science team building; he 
had extensive successful experiences in public (NIH) and non-profit (Washington University) 
bureaucracies; and he quickly built a team (System 2 á la Kahneman) to explore in cardiovascular 
treatments the kind of targeted research that was “on the tip” of biochemistry and enzymology (his 
primary professional networks) in the 1970s. The result of this effort was a break-through statin—a 
multi-billion-dollar drug—and his effort to transform the company’s research and development did not 
end with this initial innovation (Note 20). 
An additional challenge came in the vaccine division, one of the firm’s most successful operations. 
Indeed, the problem emerged following an outstanding innovation, a new vaccine to prevent Hepatitis 
B infections. After more than ten years of research, Maurice Hilleman, the head of Virus and Cell 
Biology, developed an effective vaccine by using particles of the antigen taken from the blood of 
carriers infected with the virus. Many of those carriers, however, were also infected with HIV, and that 
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prompted Vagelos to look for a new way to produce the vaccine. Current developments in rDNA 
technology offered a solution, but Merck lacked the scientific and technological capabilities needed to 
move down that path (Note 21). After appointing a new head of the research effort and creating a 
three-headed alliance with a leading scientist and a biotech, Merck was able in 1986 to bring out 
Recombivax HB, the world’s first rDNA vaccine (Note 22). 
 
6. Discussion 
As the SNL and Merck experiences, as well as other business histories from this era, suggest, the links 
between bureaucracy and innovation were more complex than any of our distinguished intellectual 
hedgehogs have indicated. While a bureaucratic culture might well impede innovation á la Schumpeter 
(and Merton), bureaucracies have continued to provide new opportunities for the individuals and firms 
selling them services (á la SNL). This allowed new firms like SNL to pursue their System 1 visions and 
test and improve their System 2 capabilities. Most of these efforts failed, as they always have in 
capitalist societies; WYSIATI has continued to foster discouraging mistakes. But the successes have 
and could in the future continue to foster disruptive innovations that keep the economy in 
disequilibrium (á la Schumpeter), on a positive growth path (Note 23). 
Meanwhile, new sciences and new technologies have encouraged even well-established, bureaucratic 
organizations to change, to embrace higher levels of uncertainty and risk, and to encourage and sustain 
internal entrepreneurs (á la Merck and Chandler). If we scan across the entire U.S. postwar economy in 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, it will be apparent that this type of responsive, innovation-oriented private 
enterprise was the exception, not the rule, in many of America’s leading industries. WYSIATI was the 
rule in automobiles, tires, and machine tools. Hence, the feeble U.S. business response when faced by 
intense overseas competition. This was also the case with the postwar public bureaucracies that 
provided more opportunities for others to innovate (á la SNL) than public innovations like the Internet 
(Note 24). Kahneman’s behavioral economics helps us break open and analyze these activities, cultures, 
and organizations as we push forward with the history of American capitalism, its entrepreneurs, and 
entrepreneurial enterprises. 
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Notes 
Note 1. I define the entrepreneur as an individual or group that combines capital, labor, natural 
resources and knowledge in a profit-seeking effort that involves some degree of novelty and, when 
successful contributes to the growth of the economy. Louis Galambos, “The Entrepreneurial Culture 
and the Mysteries of Economic Development,” Essays in Economic & Business History, 36 (2018), 
290-01; and “Commercializing Science and Promoting Academic Innovation,” Management & 
Organizational History, 13, 2 (2018), 98-101. For other recent definitions see Daniel Wadhwani and 
Christina Lubinski, “Reinventing Entrepreneurial History,” Business History Review, 91, 4 (2017), 
767-99. See also Hans Landström, “The Evolution of Entrepreneurship as a Scholarly Field,” 
Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship, 16, 2 (2020), 65-243. And Mark Casson, et al., eds., The 
Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
Note 2. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1953). 
Note 3. On disequilibrium, also see Luigi Orsenigo, “Technological Regimes: Patterns of Innovative 
Activities and Industrial Dynamics,” Cahiers d’economieetsociologierurales, 37(1995), 23-67. 
Note 4. For Schumpeter, you can start with his best and most famous studies: The Theory of Economic 
Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New York: 
Oxford University Press 1961 edition of a study first published in German in 1911). Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 3rd edition, 1950). You can probably leave 
on the book shelf Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalistic 
Process, I and II (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939), and you can certainly ignore his 
least successful essays on Imperialism & Social Classes (Cleveland: Meridian Books, a 1955 edition of 
his 1919 and 1927 publications). 
Note 5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy 
of History (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, a 1953 edition of Hegel’s 19th century lecture notes). My 
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thanks to the late Professor Leonard M. Marsak for guiding me through the Hegelian philosophy and its 
context. 
Note 6. Throughout this paper, I use the behavioral economics developed in Daniel Kahneman, 
Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013 paperback edition). See also C. 
Jolls, C. R. Sunstein, & R. Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,” 1998, available at 
http://digitalcommons.law,yale.edu/fss/papers/1765; and R. H. Thaler & C. R. Sunstein, Nudge: 
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New York: Penguin Books, 2009). 
Kahneman acknowledges his debt to Amos Tversky, Thinking Fast and Slow, 418-48. 
Note 7. On opportunities—a concept less obvious than it first appears to be—see Andrew Popp & 
Robin Holt, “The Presence of Entrepreneurial Opportunity,” Business History, 55, 1 (2013), 9-28. See 
also J.S. McMullen, L. Plummer, and Z. Acs, “What is an Entrepreneurial Opportunity?” Small 
Business Economics, 28, 4 (2007), 273-83; and Yosem E. Companys & Jeffery S. McMullen, 
“Strategic Entrepreneurs at Work: The Nature, Discovery, and Exploitation of Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities,” Small Business Economics, 28, 4(2007), 301-22.  
Note 8. While Kahneman includes entrepreneurs in chapter 24 on “The Engine of Capitalism,” he is far 
more ambivalent than Schumpeter about the impact they have on economic development. Their “risk 
taking,” he says “surely contributes to the economic dynamism of a capitalistic society, …” but he is 
unsure whether the government should help them succeed and worries about “excess entry.” Mistakes 
might be “good for the economy but bad for their investors.” Ibid., pp. 255-59. His position on 
entrepreneurship is thus consistent with his focus throughout on the cognitive biases that undercut the 
concept of the rational, economic individual at the heart of neoclassical economics.  
Note 9. It is helpful to read Chandler’s major works in the order in which they were published. Strategy 
and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1962). The 
Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1977). Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1990). For a recent, in-depth analysis of Chandler’s approach to innovation in his last few books see 
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